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Abstract:  
We use different econometric techniques, from propensity score matching to multinomial 
treatment methods, to assess the impact of internal and external remittances on several 
household budget shares in Senegal. When only considering the average impact of remittances 
on the household expenditure behaviour, we find an overall productive use of remittances. 
However, the impact of remittances disappears when the marginal spending behaviour is 
considered, i.e., households do not show a different consumption pattern with respect to their 
remittance status. The marginal spending behaviour therefore suggests that, in the decision on 
how to allocate expenditure, remittances are treated just as any other source of income. 
JEL Classification: D10, F24, O15 
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The main objective of this paper is to contribute and extend the debate on whether 
remittances impact economic development and, in particular, on how remittances are spent or 
used by the recipient households. The literature presents three views on how remittances are 
used, which depends on how they are perceived by the recipient household. The first view, 
which is part of the permanent income hypothesis, is that remittances are transitory income and 
therefore aUH VSHQW DW WKH PDUJLQ LQ PRUH µSURGXFWLYH¶ DFWLYLWLHV OLNH KXPDQ DQG SK\VLFDO
capital. If this is the case, then remittances should have a long-term impact on growth and 
development of the receiving country. The second view is that remittances are compensatory 
income and therefore spent more on consumption rather than investment goods. While this 
could result in generating domestic production perhaps, it can also lead to an indirect effect on 
inflation in a number of developing countries (Narayan et al., 2011). The final view regards 
remittances as just any other source of income and therefore no difference in the expenditure 
EHKDYLRXUHPHUJHVIURPWKHKRXVHKROGV¶UHPLWWDQFHVWDWXV 
 We conduct the analysis using migration and remittance data from a much-neglected 
region in migration research, Africa. More precisely, we use the data from Senegal, which has 
recently become one of the leading out-migration (both internal and international) countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The survey data, collected in 2009, was part of the African Migration 
Project, led by the World Bank. The data allows us to identify households with at least one 
current migrant (µmigrant household¶ hereafter) and households receiving remittances 
(µrecipient households¶ hereafter). We assume that each household has to allocate its 
expenditure on several commodities and we want to understand whether receiving remittances 
has any impact on the household decision. We are able to identify four types of goods: food, 
durable goods, education, and other type of items such as expenditure on funerals, engagements 
and weddings.1  
The remittance analysis is based on three types of households: non-recipients; internal 
recipients (remittances received from within Senegal) and external recipients (remittances 
received from international destinations). The reason for considering the origin of remittances 
is not only because internal and external migrants might have different motivations for 
                                                          
1
 The data has information on investment as well as expenditure on housing and land, but since there are large 
percentage of zeros in the expenditure on these items±about 70 per cent and 90 per cent respectively ± ZHFRXOGQ¶W
use them in our empirical analysis. The reason for such a large number of zeros could be because of no 
consumption in those categories, but also because the survey is not able to capture infrequent expenditure. This 




remitting to their families but those families who receive external remittances might perceive, 
treat and use them in a different way than those receiving internal remittances (Azizi, 2018a).2 
In fact, several empirical studies have found that internal and external remittances affect 
differently the consumption behaviour of households in terms of consumed and investment 
goods. For instance, Adams (1996) finds that internal remittances have an equalizing impact 
on income distribution while external remittances have the opposite effect (see also Clément, 
2011; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010b; Adams et al., 2008b; Castaldo and Reilly, 2007).  
Migrant and recipient households are not randomly selected ± characteristics associated 
with a particular household rather than their status of being a remittance recipient can 
potentially have an impact on their expenditure behaviour. As we could not find a suitable 
instrument in the data to correct the bias, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to evaluate 
WKH LPSDFWRI UHFHLYLQJD³WUHDWPHQW´, i.e., receiving remittances, on household expenditure 
behaviour, at the average level.3 The propensity score matching shows that internal transfers 
do not have a strong impact on household expenditure decision whereas external transfers 
negatively affect the expenditure on food while the effect on education expenditure is positive. 
It therefore shows that external remittances are used in more productive activities like 
investment in human capital rather than on consumption. 
The PSM results provide us with a benchmark against which it is possible to evaluate 
the Working-Leser model, which relates budget shares linearly to the logarithm of total 
household expenditure. For the Working-Leser model, we carry out the estimates using the 
Multinomial Treatment Regression (MTR). We employ this method because of the potential 
bias coming from the selection of unobservables. It confirms that external remittances have a 
negative effect on food expenditure and a strong positive effect on education expenditure, at 
the average level. Moreover, receiving internal remittances has a positive effect on both food 
and education which does not emerge from the PSM analysis. 
Additionally, the Working-Leser model allows us to compute marginal budget shares 
and elasticities for the different types of goods. When we explore household consumption 
decision looking at the marginal behaviour, we do not find any significant difference in how 
households allocate their expenditure. We also find that different types of recipient households 
perceive expenditure items in quite similar ways, i.e. in terms of necessity, normal or luxury 
                                                          
2
 It should be pointed out here that the objective of our paper is not to study the motivations of remittances but 
the use of remittances by the recipients. For a recent paper on motivations, see Azizi (2017). 
3 McKenzie et al. (2010) show that when it is not possible to identify a good instrumental variable, propensity 
score matching performs comparatively well. 
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goods. The demand elasticities and marginal consumption results show that remittances do not 
change the household expenditure behaviour, i.e., remittances are treated just like any other 
income.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief outlook on 
Senegal and its emergence as an important emigration country while Section 3 presents the 
relevant literature on the relation between remittances and household consumption patterns. 
Section 4 describes the dataset used in this study and Section 5 presents the propensity score 
matching techniques and the Working-Leser model. Section 6 discusses and compares the 
empirical findings and the last section concludes the paper.  
 
2. Senegal: a brief background 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is becoming an important emigration region. The rate of 
migration from Africa has evolved dramatically in early 2000s, with the growth rate in net 
migration was over 275% between 2000 and 2005 (Naudé, 2010). The stock of emigrants 
reported in 2013 for the SSA region was 23.2 million or 2.5 per cent of population (World 
Bank, 2016). The relatively high rate of outmigration is due to the interplay of different factors: 
political and economic instability, violent conflicts, climate change and deterioration of the 
environment, which include desertification and rainfall related problems.  
In comparison to the neighbouring states, Senegal experiences a good level of freedom 
and democracy both in political institutions and society, though an exception to the overall 
stability is represented by the Casamance conflict in the South of the country, during the 1980s. 
The conflict led to intense refugee outflows due to human right abuses. Also, Senegal has 
experienced a number of social, economic and political crises: the devaluation of the Franc 
CFA in 1994 and the high level of unemployment in the same period are expressions of the 
difficulties faced by the country.4 Moreover, at the beginning of 2000s poverty affected almost 
half of the population (Cisse, 2011). 
Several rainfall shocks have occurred in the whole Sahelian region in the past 50 years. 
The drought in the 1970s and 1980s had strong consequences for the economy and forced the 
population of the most affected areas to move within and outside the country. Even though 
there was a slight improvement in rainfall during the 1990s, a severe rainfall deficit occurred 
again in 2002 (Sarr, 2007) and the prospects for the future do not seem encouraging. 
                                                          
4
 50 per cent devaluation of the CFA franc against the French franc. 
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Senegal experiences both internal and external migration. Internal movements, 
especially from rural to urban regions, are the predominant form of migration. Shortage of food 
in the rural areas, adverse climate conditions and the search of economic and employment 
opportunities explain internal migration, which involves around 13 per cent of the Senegalese 
population with Dakar, Thies and Diourbel as the primary regions of destination (ANSD: 
RGPH-III, 2002). In terms of external migration, approximately 5 per cent of the population 
resides outside Senegal. West African Countries are the principal destinations, attracting 53.4 
per cent of Senegalese migrants. In Europe, France is the first preferred destination followed 
by Italy, Spain and Germany. 
As a consequence of the migration trends within and outside the country, the amount 
RIZRUNHUV¶UHPLWWDQFHVWR6HQHJDOLQFUHDVHGFRQVLGHUDEO\between 2000 and 2010. The real 
size of those transfers is unknown because of the different informal channels used to send them 
to the family left behind.5 The available official figures show that remittances quadrupled in 
less than a decade: from $305 million to $1,288 million between 2001 and 2008. The global 
financial crisis in 2008 slightly affected those monetary flows resulting in a decline of 8 
percentage points. 1HYHUWKHOHVVPLJUDQWV¶WUDQVIHUVDFFRXQWHGIRUSHUFHQWRI*'3LQ
compared to 6 per cent in 2001. A survey conducted in 2007 by the African Development Bank, 
which covers both formal and informal transfers, estimates that remittances to Senegal 
accounted for 19 per cent of the GDP in 2009. The larger proportion of transfers are generated 
in the European Union (52 per cent) mostly from France, Italy and Spain (Cisse, 2011). 
Regular remittances are a new phenomenon and more and more households, especially 
in the rural areas, depend on those transfers to satisfy various daily needs. The second 
Senegalese Household Survey (ANSD: ESAM II, 2004) shows that the funds received from 
abroad have increased the average per capita expenditure of recipient households by almost 60 
per cent compared to those households who do not receive remittances. It seems that the larger 
proportion of remittances goes to current consumption (Cisse, 2011; Some, 2009); and at the 
national level those transfers have reduced poverty by almost one-third (ANSD: ESAM II, 
2004). 
 
3. Literature review 
The household is the first unit which takes decision on the use of remittances and 
therefore, in essence, it determines the role remittances play in the development process of the 
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 Sending them through post, intermediaries or migrants carrying cash themselves. 
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receiving country. Remittances are received under imperfect information, uncertainty and with 
different regularity (Seshan, 2012; Chami et al., 2005) and therefore how they are perceived 
by the households is not straightforward. Based on the previous empirical studies, the impact 
of remittances on household expenditure decision has been interpreted mainly according to 
three different views, discussed in the Introduction above, which show that it is the way 
households perceive transfers which makes their use more or less productive. Recent studies 
interpret remittances as a transitory income and conclude for a positive effect of remittances 
on different types of investment goods: productive activities, housing, education and health. 
Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003), for example, analyse how different types of income ± 
remittances and income from other sources ± DIIHFW WKH KRXVHKROG GHFLVLRQ RQ FKLOGUHQ¶V
schooling level in El Salvador. They use a 1997 household survey of 14,286 individuals 
between the ages of 6 and 24 and conclude that the source of income does matter in the 
household decision for the investment in schooling: remittances have a larger positive effect 
on school retention both in urban and rural areas, even if the impact is stronger in the urban 
area. A positive impact of remittances on child education is also supported by Kifle (2007) in 
the case of Eritrea. He used 125 remittance receiving households with young members between 
the ages of 7 and 20 years and found that recipient households spend a significant proportion 
of remittances on child education. Also, Mansour et al., (2011), in the context of Jordan, 
conclude for positive contributions of remittances on human capital accumulation of relatively 
young people. Another empirical evidence of the strong link between remittances and 
education is found in Azizi (2018b). Using data from 122 developing countries over the period 
1990-2015 he shows that international remittances have a positive effect on school enrolment, 
completion rate and quality of education with some stronger effects for girls. Moreover, he 
finds that international remittances raise health expenditure, reduce the depth of food deficit 
and result in lower prevalence of stunting. 
Using data from the Philippines, Yang (2008) examines how household expenditure 
behaviour responds to a favourable exchange rate shock when external remittances are 
received. In particular, the paper looks at the expenditure pattern of 1646 households before 
and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The positive income shock, caused by the appreciation 
RI WKH PLJUDQW¶V FXUUHQF\ DJDLQVW WKH 3KLOLSSLQH SHVR UDLVHV WKH H[SHQGLWXUH RQ HGXFDWLRQ
Receiving more remittance income is associated with a positive effect on the ownership of 
various types of durable goods, hours worked in self-employment and investment in the capital-
intensive enterprises like transportation, communication and manufacturing. The exchange rate 
shock most likely relaxed the credit constraints faced by the households, providing them with 
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the necessary resources to start new business activities (see also Woodruff and Zenteno, 2004). 
In a study based on 14 states in Mexico, Taylor and Mora (2006) control for different migrant 
destinations and therefore for potentially different sources of remittances. The main focus of 
their work was to look at the household marginal spending behaviour among three different 
types of households: those without migrants, those with internal migrants and finally the 
households with international migrants. They find differences in the expenditure behaviour 
among the three types of households. In particular, compared to non-migrant households, those 
with international migrants show a considerably large marginal spending for investment while 
those with internal migrants spend more on services, health and housing. Their findings support 
the view of a productive use of remittances. The same conclusion is reached by Adams and 
Cuecuecha (2010a) who also take into account different sources of remittances. Using a 
nationally-representative household survey in Guatemala, they find that at the margin 
households receiving both internal and external remittances spend more on human capital and 
investment goods - like education and housing - and less on food. Musumba et al. (2015), using 
data from Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya, show that remittances are more likely to be spent on 
education and savings in Ethiopia and Uganda than in Kenya. Their study stresses on the 
importance of frequency of communication between senders and recipients in the remittance 
amounts and allocation. Finally, Aggarwal et al. (2011) explores another potential channel 
WKURXJKZKLFKUHPLWWDQFHVPLJKWKDYHDSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRQUHFLSLHQWFRXQWULHV¶GHYHORSPHnt.  
Using remittance flows from 109 countries over the period 1975-2007 they find a positive link 
between international remittances and financial sector development: remittances are positively 
associated with bank deposits and credit. 
A more pessimistic view on how remittances are spent at the household level argues 
that transfers are used more on consumption rather than investment goods and they do not have 
any positive effect on development. This conclusion is strongly supported by Chami et al. 
(2005) who define remittances as compensatory transfers for poor economic performance.6 
Their empirical analysis reveals that remittances are negatively correlated with GDP growth 
and therefore those flows of money do not appear to be a source for economic development 
but rather may cause some behavioural changes at the household level: recipients reduce their 
labour supply and labour market participation. In another paper, Adams and Cuecuecha 
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 However, their empirical approach was challenged by Catrinescu et al. (2009) who, using the same data as 
Chami et al. (2005), showed that omitted variable bias was partially responsible for their results. In particular, 
controlling for political institutions in the receiving country, Catrinescu et al. showed a positive, albeit small, 
effect of remittances on investment and therefore on GDP growth.   
8 
  
(2010b) find that in Indonesia remittances affect positively the marginal expenditure of one 
key consumption good ± food ± while the marginal expenditure on housing, considered an 
investment good, gets reduced. This finding contradicts what the same authors find in the 
similar study on Guatemala. They argue that contradictory results could be explained by the 
fact that households in the two countries receive different amount of transfers: the level of 
remittances received by the Guatemalan households is higher than those in Indonesia. In 
addition, the recipients in the latter case are much poorer. This explains why in Guatemala 
households receiving remittances are able to devote more of their marginal expenditure to 
investment goods, while in Indonesia remittances are spent mostly on the consumption of basic 
goods. Also, Clément (2011) supports the idea that remittances are not used in a productive 
way. He shows that in Tajikistan international remittances significantly increase the household 
consumption level but have a negative impact on investment expenditures. However, the effect 
of internal remittances is not clear as they affect two investment goods in opposite directions: 
domestic transfers reduce expenditure on housing and agriculture but increase spending on 
health. No effect of remittances is found on other key investment variables such as education. 
He justifies this finding with the fact that health outcome is a short-term priority while 
education and agriculture represent long-term investments. He concludes that internal 
remittances help households to achieve a basic level of consumption. Finally, no link between 
migration and productive investment is found by Zhu et al. (2014) in rural China. They 
conclude that remittances, generated by circular or repeated migration, are predominantly used 
for consumption purposes. 
Another way to look at remittances is to consider them fungible and therefore just as 
any other source of income. If a euro of income of remittances is treated by the household as a 
HXURRIZDJHLQFRPHWKHQPLJUDQW¶VWUDQVIHUVGRQRWSURGXFHDQ\FKDQJHLQhow the household 
allocate its expenditure. A number of empirical studies show that remittances do not have a 
differentiated impact on household expenditure behaviour, concluding that income is just 
income wherever it is generated. For example, Adams et al. (2008a) arrive at the same 
conclusion in their comparative study on household marginal spending behaviour in Ghana. 
Using the 2005/2006 Ghana Living Standards Survey, they investigate on a wide range of 
consumption and investment goods to capture any significant effect of remittances on 
household expenditure decision but it seems that remittance income is treated just like any 
other source of income. Similar results are obtained by Castaldo and Reilly (2007) for Albania 
and Ang et al. (2009) for the Philippines. However, Tabuga (2007) using the Philippines data 
9 
  
finds mixed results.  He shows that remittances are used for consumption purposes but they are 
also invested on education and housing. 
A possible explanation for the existence of that wide range of empirical findings could 
be the difference in countries income level and perhaps in investment opportunities. It seems 
reasonable to think that remittances in middle-income countries are treated differently than in 
countries with a very low income level. In the latter case transfers are perhaps used as any other 
source of income without any behavioural change in the way in which households decide to 
allocate their expenditure. Moreover, Brown and Leaves (2011) suggest that duration and 
intensity of migration as well as the structure of the economic activity within the community 
play a significant role in the decision on how to use remittances. 
 
4. Data 
We investigate household expenditure behaviour using data from a recent Migration 
and Remittance Household Survey in Senegal.7 This survey is part of the African Migration 
Project (AMP) conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa by the African Development Bank and the 
World Bank during 2009 and 2010.8 7KH$IULFD0LJUDWLRQ6XUYH\GHILQHVPLJUDQWDV³DSHUVRQ
who used to live in a household in the country in which the interview is being conducted but 
left before the interview to live abroad, or in another village or urban area within the country, 
for at least six months´. Remittances include both external (cross-border) and internal (within-
country) transfers of resources (both monetary and in-kind) sent by migrant workers to their 
families. 
The survey is representative at the national level and provides information on members 
and household characteristics, expenditure, migration and remittances. The data file contains 
1,953 households of which 713 are without any migrants, 523 have internal migrants only, 561 
have external migrants and 156 have both categories of migrants.  
As the focus of this study is on the impact of remittances on household expenditure 
behaviour, we use the following groups: remittance recipients (which is further divided into 
                                                          
7 We do not have any information on earnings which is why we conduct our analysis on household expenditure. 
This is in line with most demand studies since household income can be measured with error whereas information 
on expenditure seems more reliable (see Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010b; Adams et al., 2008a). Individuals may be 
adverse in saying exactly how much they earn and moreover it is more volatile and affected by certain life events 
while spending is maintained at a more constant level over time. Therefore, spending seems to be a better 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDYHUDJHLQFRPH 
8 The financial crisis is likely to have affected the international remittance flows to Senegal, which might have 
DIIHFWHGKRXVHKROGV¶H[SHQGLWXUHEHKDYLRXURYHUWLPe. However, note that the objective of our paper is the 
analysis of the difference between the expenditure behaviour of recipient and non-recipient households, and not 
how the expenditure changes over time.  
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internal and external recipients) and non-recipients.  After excluding households with missing 
information, our sample contains 1,945 households: 1,002 remittance recipients (out of which 
329 are internal recipients and 673 are external recipients) and 943 non-recipients.9 
The survey collected detailed information on different types of household expenditure. 
We aggregate them considering the following categories: expenditure on food, durables, 
education, health and other goods. As explained in the introduction, µhousing and land¶ and 
µinvestment¶ are excluded from the empirical analysis given the large number of zeroes for 
those categories. The information on household expenditure is collected with attention to the 
different frequency of consumption. The survey provides weekly expenditure for some items 
(e.g. food) while monthly and half-yearly for others (e.g. durable goods). As the objective of 
this work is to understand the impact of remittances on household expenditure decision and the 
question on the amount of remittances received refers to the previous year, we aggregate each 
type of expenditure to obtain annual values. Table 1 presents a description of what each 
category of expenditure contains. Table 2 shows how much, on average, each type of household 
devotes to the different expenditures. It also includes a z-test performed to investigate whether 
differences in the means of the budget share devoted to a particular group of expenditure exist 
between the different types of households. The reported p-values indicate that the null 
hypothesis of equal means between recipient households versus those who are non-recipient 
has to be rejected for durables, education and health. Recipient households spend less on 
durables and more on education and health.  
 
5. Methodology 
The Engel curve approach is generally adopted to analyse the impact of remittances on 
household expenditure patterns. The main challenge of this approach is to address the concern 
linked to the endogeneity of remittances. The usual way to deal with the endogeneity is to use 
the instrumental variable approach. The literature provide us with a large number of potential 
instruments to address the endogeneity of remittances. Some of those instruments are related 
to economic conditions in the remittance-sending countries, e.g., per capita GDP, 
unemployment rate and real interest rate (see Aggarwal et a. 2011 and Azizi, 2018b). These 
instruments have the potential of working well for the group of households receiving 
remittances from external migrants because the economic conditions of the countries where 
                                                          
9
 Among the recipient households, 946 have a migrant in the household. The migrant and recipient households 
overlap but do not coincide. 
11 
  
remittances are generated do not affect the outcome variables in the destination country. The 
problem we face in using those instruments is that our study focuses on both the external as 
well as internal transfers. The main issue in finding a good instrument for those households 
receiving remittances within Senegal is that the information on economic conditions of sending 
and receiving region overlap. Instruments related to the sending country, i.e. Senegal, are very 
likely to be correlated with the outcome variables, making them invalid. Cost of remittances 
(e.g. numbers of branches of Western Union and post offices) could be a valid alternative in 
our case but that that information is not available at the municipally level in Senegal. Due to 
data limitation the identification of a suitable instrument is not possible in our case.10 McKenzie 
et al. (2010) and McKenzie and Sasin (2007) provide evidence that when a good instrument is 
not available, among the non-experimental methods, propensity score matching performs 
comparatively well, whereas a poor instrument considerably increases the bias. We therefore 
employ propensity score matching (PSM) as an alternative approach and implement various 
matching methods to check the robustness of our results (see Clément, 2011; Equivel, Huerta-
Pineda, 2007 and Bertoli and Marchetta, 2014).  
The basic idea of the PSM is to estimate the average treatment effect related to the 
receipt of remittances on the outcome of interest ± average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT). In particular, we compare the average expenditure behaviour of those households 
receiving remittances with those who do not receive remittances, matching the two groups of 
households according to similar characteristics. The difference in behaviour will then be 
attributed to the existence of remittances. 
 The method consists of two stages. The first stage involves the estimation of the 
propensity score which represents the probability of receiving the treatment conditional on 
observed covariates. Given that the participation to the treatment is expressed as a dichotomous 
variable, the estimation of the propensity score uses logit or probit models. The second stage 
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 A valid instrument has to be (i) relevant in explaining the probability of receiving remittances and (ii) exogenous 
to the household expenditure behaviour. As argued by McKenzie and Sasin (2007), finding a suitable instrument, 
which is strongly correlated with the receipt of remittances and has no direct impact on the household expenditure 
patterns, is a challenging task. We constructed several variables but all of them failed to be adequate instruments 
as they were insignificant in explaining the probability of receiving remittances. We tried the average level of 
rainfall by region and district for the period 1990-2009; level of unemployment in rural-urban areas in 1994-1995; 
amount of remittances received in 1992 by regional level; percentage of internal and external migration by region 
for several years; level of migration by ethnic group in 2004. These variables were constructed using information 
from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal (World Bank) and The Agence Nationale De La Statistique et De La 
Demographie (ANSD). None of them proved to be a suitable instrument. A possible explanation is that these were 
at an aggregated level. Unfortunately we were not able to find information at village or municipality levels which 




matches household receiving remittances with non-recipients based on their propensity score. 
The matching estimators ensure that treated and comparison units with propensity scores 
sufficiently close are matched. The methodology is presented in detail in Appendix 1.  
A key step in the implementation of the PSM is related to the selection of the covariates. 
In the identification of the variables for the estimation of the propensity score we follow Bertoli 
and Marchetta (2014) including only pre-treatment household characteristics and excluding all 
those variables which could have been affected by the treatment. For example, given that in 
the context of developing countries, migration is driven by men, treated households tend to be 
disproportionally female-headed. Differently, untreated female-headed households could be 
just the result of widowhood. Therefore, it is misleading to compare treated households with a 
group of households whose expenditure choice reflects this permanent negative shock. We 
exclude as explanatory variables those related to the household head and even measures of 
asset holdings as they could be endogenous to the treatment (see Bertoli, 2010). In fact, the 
objective of the propensity score is to serve as a balancing score and not to maximize the fit of 
the model. 
We again follow, as much as possible, Bertoli and Marchetta (2014) in defining the 
variables related to household composition and schooling for the migrant households. Those 
characteristics are constructed using the information of all household members including 
current migrant(s). Table 3 shows the difference in characteristics between including and 
excluding migrants in the household composition and schooling. For example, we notice that 
migrants are positively selected on education within the households; in fact, the years of 
schooling increases when migrants are considered. This proves the importance of having 
information on all household members in order to implement a correct econometric analysis, 
as it helps compare the two different types of households: recipients and non-recipients.  
Several matching methods are used: The nearest neighbour consists in searching for 
each treated unit the closest control unit in terms of propensity score. Then the difference for 
each pair of matched units is computed and the ATT is obtained as average of all these 
differences. The method is implemented with replacement allowing for the untreated 
households to be used more than once as a match.11 The nearest five neighbours and the nearest 
ten neighbours are the generalization of this method allowing the use of five and ten 
counterfactuals, respectively, for each treated unit.  The radius caliper estimator consists in 
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 If we do not allow replacement, it is more likely to get bad matches as some of the high-score treated households 
will be matched to low-score non-treated. Lower average quality matching will increase the bias. 
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matching each treated unit with those control units whose propensity score falls into a 
neighbourhood of the propensity score of the treated unit. The caliper defines the dimension of 
the neighbour (see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). We fix the caliper at 0.01.12 The kernel method 
matches each treated unit with a weighted average of all control units and finally the 
mahalanobis-metric matches on the covariates: each treated is matched to a control unit who 
is the closest in terms of distance in covariates. 
Each of the methods introduced above present advantages and drawbacks in terms of 
trade-off between quality and quantity of the matches. Because none of them is superior to 
another and their performance depends on the data used in the research, their joint 
implementation can be used as robustness check. Moreover, in our study we conduct separate 
analysis with respect to the origin of remittances. The exclusive treatments considered are: (i) 
receiving remittances; (ii) receiving internal remittances and (iii) receiving external 
remittances. The households participating in one of these treatments are matched one at a time 
with those who do not receive remittances. 
The propensity score matching methods estimate the average impact of receiving 
remittances on different household expenditures. That gives some insights into the role of 
migration and remittances on the different types of expenditure but unfortunately it does not 
allow us to capture whether relevant differences exist at the marginal expenditure behaviour 
among households receiving and not receiving remittances. The marginal budget shares can be 
easily calculated implementing the Working-Leser model.  
A general specification of the Working-Leser model for our particular purpose can be 
expressed as: 
ijdjijijiiij uRXY  TJED explog      (1)  
 where Yij is the budget share in good i for household j, Xj includes the same household 
characteristics used to generate the propensity score in the matching process, uij is the 
idiosyncratic shock with mean zero and constant variance which captures the unknown 
variation in the ith budget share for the jth household and Rdj is a vector of mutually exclusive 
binary variables capturing whether or not the household j receives remittances from one 
destination instead of another.13 The exclusive dummy variable is identified in the following 
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 We also tried 0.05, the results do not change. 
13
 The use of binary measures for whether or not households receive remittances is a common approach followed 
by Adams and Cuecuecha (2010a), Castaldo and Reilly (2007), Zarate-Hoyos (2004). It is justified by the fact 
that monetary values for remittances may be affected by measurement errors. 
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categories: receiving internal remittances only and receiving remittances from abroad only; 
receiving no remittances represents the base group for the empirical analysis. The parameter of 
interest is 廔i which shows the effect of the different treatments on the relevant budget share.  
Those impacts can be compared with the results obtained from the matching methods.  
The Working-Leser model could be easily estimated using a simple OLS analysis.  
However, the drawback of OLS method is that it does not account for the endogeneity of 
UHPLWWDQFHV UHIOHFWLQJ PLJUDQW¶V HDUQLQJV DQG XQREVHUYDEOH LQGLYLGXDO DQG KRXVHKROG
characteristics that may also affect the migration decision. Dep and Trivedi (2006) and Dep 
(2009) propose an estimation framework, the Multinomial Treatment Regression (MTR), 
which fits our case when the source of remittances is considered. The model is composed of an 
outcome equation and a selection equation linked via observed and unobserved characteristics. 
The selection equation, which in our specification is identified as receiving remittances, models 
the generating process of the treatment variable and follows a mixed multionomial logit 




















      (2) 
 
The likelihood of receiving remittances from destination d depends on a set of household 
characteristics zj and a latent factor ljd which represents the unobserved household 
heterogeneity affecting the probability of receiving remittances from destination d. 
 Under this setting, the outcome equation, modelled in the Working-Leser framework 
can be rewritten as: 
 ijjdddjijijiiij ulRXY  OTJED explog     (3) 
The parameters 廗d are selection terms which reflect the correlation between the unobservable 
determinants of receiving remittances (compared to non-receiving) and the budget share in 
good i. The model is estimated using maximum simulated likelihood based on Halton 
6HTXHQFHV XVLQJ WKH ³mtreatreg´ FRPPDQG LQ 67$7$14 The nonlinear form of the 
multinomial equation allows the joint model for remittance status and budget share in good i 
                                                          
14
 See Deb (2009) for more detail on ³PWUHDWUHJ´'HEDQG7ULYHGLVXJJHVWWKDWLQRUGHUWRUHPRYHWKH
simulation bias, the number of simulation draws should be higher than the square root of the number of 
observations. Given that we have 1919 observations in our sample, we perform 100 draws. The model also 
requires that the covariances between errors of different remittances status be fixed (įdk=0 ׊ GN) and that įdd=0 ׊ d which normalizes the choice of each remittance equation. 
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to be identified even if the variables in the two equations are identical (i.e. xj=zj). Given that 
we were not able to identify an instrument suitable for our case, we rely only on the nonlinear 
functional form of the remittance status equation.  
As the Working-Leser model relates budget shares linearly to the logarithm of total 
household expenditure, it allows us to easily derive marginal budget shares and elasticities (see 
Clément, 2011). 15 Therefore, for studying whether behavioural changes exist at the marginal 
level, we interact the log of total expenditure with the mutually exclusive dummy variables 
controlling for the different remittance statuses. The Working-Leser model expressed in 
equation (3) becomes: 
ijjddjdjidjijijiiij ulRRXY  OETJED explogexplog *   (4) 
It is possible to compute marginal budget shares and elasticities for each remittance status, e.g. 
receiving them from internal and external migrants (see Appendix 2). 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Estimates from PSM 
Table 4 contains the summary statistics of the explanatory variables used in the 
empirical analysis, including information about the household members who are currently 
abroad. Differences exist in the household size as well as the composition of the two types of 
households: recipient vs non-recipient. The size of the household is much larger for those 
household receiving remittances compared to the one who do not. Moreover, the presence of 
children and elderlies is higher for the recipient households. 
 The estimation of the propensity scores, which are computed for the five different types 
of households using the logit model,16 reveals the effect of each covariate on the probability to 
be in one of the treatment which is presented as a binary outcome. Table 5 shows the logistic 
regressions for each treatment. Most of the explanatory variables have the expected sign. For 
example, the presence of elderly and children above 5 years of age positively affect the 
probability of being in a recipient household.17 Then, on the one hand, higher average level of 
schooling of the household members positively increases the probability of receiving one of 
                                                          
15 The chosen functional form displays several advantages. It provides a good statistical fit to a wide range of 
commodities; the slope is free to change with the expenditure level and it conforms to the criterion of additivity 
( ?ܥ ௜௝ȁ݁ݔ݌௝= 1) (where ?ܥ ௜௝  indicates the sum of each item consumed by household j). 
16
 These are migrant, recipient, migrant and recipient, internal recipient only and external recipient only. 
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the treatments, while on the other hand having a member with college education decreases the 
probability of the household to be an external recipient. 
 Overall, we find robust results across the different methods of matching for the various 
types of expenditures. Propensity score methods focus on common support of scores and Fig. 
1 shows that only a very small portion of units are outside of the common support. However, 
the kernel estimator performs better in terms of bias reduction in each treatment setting. We 
check whether matching on each probability to receive the treatment balances our regressors. 
Table 6 shows the standardized bias18 for the p-score before and after the matching, together 
with the achieved percentage of reduced bias which is above 99 per cent for each treatment 
considered. Finally, the quality of the matching is shown in Figs 2 and 3. We plot the 
distribution of the propensity scores for treated and untreated households before and after the 
matching by type of treatment. The graphs illustrate the improvement of post-matching 
propensity scores and visually indicate that the matching was successful.19 
 The effect on the treated (ATT) using the different matching estimators are reported 
in Table 7. According to the t-statistics, remittance recipient households allocate differently 
their expenditure on food, education and health. Of the recipient households, internal 
remittances do not change household behaviour while receiving external remittances versus no 
remittances impacts negatively the proportion of expenditure on food and positively the 
expenditure on education. These results give some positive signs that remittances are used for 
productive purposes, though they need to be interpreted with caution. Given the potential 
selection bias linked to unobservables, we further conduct the analysis using the Working-
Leser model with MTR20. 
 
6.2 The Working-Leser Model: Multinomial Treatment Regression 
Using the Multinomial Treatment Regression (MTR) model to estimate jointly the 
functional form expressed in equations (2) and (3), we compare the effect of remittances on 
different budget shares with the matching estimates. Through this method we try to overcome 
the potential issue of endogeneity related to remittances which we were not able to address 
                                                          
18
 The standardized bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and untreated subsamples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and untreated groups 
19
 This VKRZVWKDWWKHEDODQFLQJSURSHUW\RIWKHPRGHOLVQRWDQLVVXH³:KHQWKLVGRHVnot occur, so that balancing 
is not fully achieved, one should find another specification of the propensity-score´*&HUXOOLS 
20
 We have also run estimates for the Working-Leser model using a simple OLS which confirms, on the one hand, 
the impact of receiving external remittances on food (negative) and education (positive) and on the other hand, 
the very weak impact of internal remittances on the different household budget shares. Given the very close 
findings between the OLS and the PSM estimates, for conciseness, the OLS estimates are not presented. However, 
they are available upon request. 
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with the PSM. Estimation with the selection equation (2), expressed in a multinomial form, is 
reported in Table 8 21 22 while Table 9 shows the estimation of our outcome variables as 
expressed in equation (3) which includes the log of total annual expenditure as extra covariate. 
The mutually exclusive remittance statuses are expressed as dummy variables and their effect 
are jointly estimated with the household characteristics.  In particular, the corrected estimates 
of the budget share equations suggest that receiving internal remittances positively affects the 
expenditure on food (more than 8 per cent) and education (around 2 per cent), which the PSM 
estimates does not capture. However, receiving external remittances confirms its negative 
impact on food and positive impact on education. Moreover, the MTR captures a positive effect 
of external remittances on other goods. The positive effect of remittances on expenditure on 
education is supported by the literature (Adams and Cuecuecha ,2010a; Musumba et al., 2015). 
Remittances serve to overcome household credit-constrains with positive effect on school 
enrolment, attendance and completion rate (Azizi, 2018b; Bouoiyour and Miftah, 2016). 
The rest of Table 9 shows the impact of household characteristics on each type of 
expenditure considered. For example, we find that the share of women in the household is not 
relevant in the way the budget share is allocated across different types of household 
expenditures. It is rather average years of schooling that plays an important role in the 
expenditure decision. The composition of the household is important for understanding how 
the expenditure is allocated. As expected, the presence of elderly in the household affect 
negatively the expenditure on education and positively the budget share allocated to health. 
The presence of children, however, increases the expenditure on food and education. 
Households living in a rural location spend 2.4 per cent more on food: we expected to find the 
contrary impact and it may depend on the low productivity of the soil due to rainfall shocks. 
Instead, those households living in rural areas spend more on other expenditures, which 
includes engagements, weddings and funerals due possibly to the fact that in rural areas 
traditions are stronger. 
The coefficients corresponding to the logarithm of total expenditure allow us to 
compute the marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities of the commodities 
considered. On average, as total annual expenditure increases, households spend 7 per cent less 
                                                          
21 7KHURXWLQH³075($75(*´GRHVQRWSURYLGHPDUJLQDOHIIHFWVIRUWKHPXOWLnomial treatment equation. Given 
that the point estimates are almost identical to those obtained from a standard Multinomial Logit, we report the 
average marginal effects of the standard Multinomial Logit Model. 
22
 The effect of each covariate on the probability of receiving remittances for the different remittance statutes 
resulting from the Mixed Multinomial Logit model are very similar, in terms of coefficient size and level of 
significance, to the estimates derived by the logistic regression implemented to compute the propensity score. 
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on food, 6 per cent less on durables and 1 per cent less on education, while its impact on the 
budget share devoted to health and other goods is positive and strongly significant. As the total 
annual expenditure increases, households spend 1 per cent more on health and 3 per cent more 
on other type of goods. The marginal budget shares and elasticities for each category of goods 
considered are computed using eqs. (A2.4) and (A2.5) in the Appendix, and they are reported 
in Table 10. The figures reveal that for one FranF&)$LQFUHDVHLQ WKHKRXVHKROG¶VEXGJHW
expenditure on food rises by 0.27 of a Franc and on durables by 0.53 of a Franc. In addition, 
the expenditure increases by 0.04 and 0.09 of a Franc, respectively, on education and health 
and 0.16 of a Franc on other expenditures. Overall, at the margin, households devote more of 
their expenditure on food and durables. 
The estimates for expenditure elasticities suggest that food, durables and education are 
necessity goods while the other commodities are luxury items. We find that education is 
perceived by the Senegalese households as more important than other types of expenditures. It 
is possible that after a certain age or school level, education becomes a luxury expenditure, 
though it is difficult to determine the cut-off point at which that happens. But, in general, the 
fact that education is a necessity good (elasticity is less than one) means that households realize 
the value of human capital accumulation as an investment for a better life in the future. 
After interacting the log of total expenditure with the dummies for the remittance status, 
as expressed in equation (4), we run again the MTR23 and compute the marginal spending 
behaviour and elasticities. The results are reported in Table 10. In terms of marginal budget 
shares and elasticities for each category of expenditure the source of remittances does not seem 
to be relevant in explaining the household behaviour at the margin. In fact, not only the 
estimates for the marginal budget shares and elasticities show some little difference in how 
recipient households allocate their expenditure, but a two-tailed test reveals that these 
differences are not even significant.  
In summary, when we only consider the average impact of remittances on the household 
production behaviour, we find signs of a productive use of remittances to education. However, 
the effect of remittances disappears when we perform a further investigation interacting the log 
of expenditure with the sources of remittances. First, the interaction terms are insignificant, 
and second, we find no significant differences in the marginal budget shares and elasticities 
among the different remittance recipient households. 
                                                          
23
 Given that the interaction terms are insignificant and the rest our controls behave as shown in Table 9, we do 
not present the estimates of equation (4) here but these are available upon request. 
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Even if some differences exist between PSM and MTR estimation methods in the 
average expenditure, when we focus on the marginal spending behaviour and elasticities, after 
interacting the log of total expenditure with the dummies for the remittance status, the MTR 
does not reveal any significant impact of remittances on household consumption. Table 10 
shows that the two-tailed test is below 1.64 (level of significance at 10 per cent) for each 
category of expenditure considered by the remittance status.  
   
7. Conclusions 
0LJUDQW¶VWUDQVIHUVFDQSRWHQWLDOO\SOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVDQG
it is important to understand how recipient households perceive and use them. The question on 
what remittances represent for the households is still a topic of debate. The way remittances 
are spent ± on consumption or investment goods ± is strictly determined by the context of the 
analysis. We contribute to the existing debate by investigating the impact of remittances on 
household expenditure behaviour in Senegal. The Migration and Remittances Household 
Survey conducted in 2009 allowed us to identify three types of households: non-recipients, 
internal recipients and external recipients. It is important to consider households according to 
their remittance status because PLJUDQWV¶ WUDQVIHUVFRXOGGLIIHUQRWRQO\LQWKHLUDPRXQWEXW
also with respect to their origin and where transfers originate can affect how they are perceived 
by the receiving households. 
We considered five types of expenditure: food, consumption and durable goods, 
education, health and other types of expenditure. The empirical analysis was conducted using 
propensity score matching techniques and the average treatment effect (receiving remittances) 
was estimated by matching treated households with those not treated that are similar on the 
basis of their observable characteristics which are not affected by the treatment. This 
methodology performs comparatively well when a good instrument is not available. Among 
the different types of remittances, the matching estimators showed that external remittances 
have the stronger effect on the household expenditure behaviour. Food and education are the 
budget shares in which the average difference between treated and non-treated households is 
significant. Those receiving external transfers spend on average less on food and more on 
education. These results give signal of a productive use of remittances. 
We also compared the propensity score matching estimates with the Working-Leser 
model which allowed us to extend the analysis to the expenditure behaviour at the margin. We 
use multinomial treatment regression (MTR) methods relying on non-linearity of the 
20 
  
remittance equation only and found that those households who receive remittances, internally 
or externally, spend more on education which can be interpreted as a way to invest in the future 
generations. The impact of remittances on food is ambiguous: positive if remittances are 
received internally and negative if received externally. It is difficult to interpret the impact of 
remittances on food given that we aggregate different varieties in one category. Households 
have different food preferences depending also on the age of household members and it is 
possible that the decrease (increase) of consumption of some more expensive items in favour 
(to the detriment) of others reflect preferences in taste and nutrition. In terms of the impact of 
remittances on marginal spending behaviour we cannot conclude for a strong difference in 
consumption behaviour among the different households¶ remittance status in Senegal. It seems 
that in the decision on how to allocate expenditure, remittances are treated just as any other 
source of income in the sense that recipient households do not identify remittances for a specific 
purpose. This result does not support the view that remittances make act as a valve for 
GHYHORSPHQWEXWLWGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWPLJUDQWV¶WUDQVIHUVFDQQRWEHXVHGLQDSURGXFWLYHZD\
Poverty and disparities in income per capita among developing countries help explain why 
households use remittances for different purposes. This last argument is supported by Adams 
et al. (2008a) who explain why they find different results in Ghana and Guatemala: low 
income-countries perhaps value income from remittances just as wage income but it could be 
possible that in the long run, after the household is able to provide a minimum level of basic 
commodities, the role and perception of remittances change. This suggests that remittances can 
play a role in the development process only if there is a common effort to ensure some 
minimum standard of living among the whole population. We believe that better quality of 
information and an environment (or institutions and local governments) which stimulates 
investment, e.g., higher incentives for education, better infrastructure, lower uncertainty, can 
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Table 1- Description of the expenditure categories 
Category Description 
Food cereals, legumes, oilseeds, tubers, vegetables, fruit, meat etc. 
 
Durables clothing, footwear, cost of mobile phone, internet, luxury goods, utilities, appliances, vehicles, computer, 
electronic goods.   
  
House& Land* house, land, home improvement, rent, mortgage, loan repayment 
  
Investment* productive assets, setting a business, open a store, farming equipment. 
  
Education books, school supplies, uniforms, registration fees. 
  
Health doctor fees, lab fees, hospitalization, prescription. 
  
Other goods include expenditure on wedding, engagement, funerals. 
 
*The categories house & land and investment are excluded from the empirical analysis because of the low percentage of households 
with positive expenditure.  
 
Table 2 ± Average budget shares for each commodity by remittance status 
 
Food Durables Education Health Other  
No remittances 0.34 0.80 0.05 0.07 0.13 
Remittances 0.33 0.73 0.06 0.08 0.13 
P-value 0.26 0.04*** 0.00*** 0.03** 0.62 
Notes: P-values show the level of significance at which we can reject the hypothesis of equal means between the 
sample proportion of remittance-receiver and non-receiver households; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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HH size 10.581 12.384 
Average age of working members 33.150 32.961 
No of working female members 3.203 3.571 
No of working age members 5.386 7.109 
No. of children (5-15 years old) 3.222 3.228 
No. of elderly (>65) 0.436 0.454 
Average years of schooling 3.154 3.605 
Having at least a member with college 0.105 0.164 
N 1239 1239 
Notes: (1) Sampling weights used to compute all descriptive statistics. (2) Household with migrants also includes  
those households who do not receive remittances form their migrant members. 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics by type of household 
 
 
Non-recipient  Recipient 
Ethnicity: Woloff 0.475  0.611 
Ethnicity: Pular 0.312  0.207 
HH size 8.734  12.452 
No. of working age members 4.858  6.511 
Average working age members 32.998  32.842 
Female share (>15) 0.295  0.301 
Elderly (>65) 0.209  0.420 
Children (5-15) 0.783  0.871 
Averge years of schooling 3.720  3.636 
Having a t least a member with college 0.136  0.165 
Rural location 0.437  0.561 
Region: Dakar 0.339  0.213 
Region: Dioubel 0.039  0.147 
Region: Fatick 0.045  0.069 
Region: Kaolack 0.120  0.180 
Region: Kolda 0.061  0.045 
Region: Louga 0.032  0.078 
Region: Matam 0.072  0.040 
Region: St-Louis 0.034  0.050 
Region: Tambacounda 0.040  0.022 
Region: Thies 0.178  0.145 
Region: Ziguinchor 0.041  0.009 
N 943  1002 
Notes: (1) Sampling weights used to compute all descriptive statistics. (2) Members currently abroad are included in the 
















Ethnicity: Woloff 0.093*** 0.024 0.127*** 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.038) 
Ethnicity: Pular 0.080** 0.015 0.114** 
 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.045) 
HH size 0.003 -0.008* 0.008** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
No. of working age members 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Average working age members 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Female share (>15) 0.141 -0.063 0.218** 
 
(0.088) (0.096) (0.095) 
Elderly (>65) 0.126*** 0.075*** 0.139*** 
 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.029) 
Children (5-15) 0.093*** 0.088*** 0.064* 
 
(0.034) (0.032) (0.036) 
Average years of schooling 0.020*** 0.009** 0.022*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Having at least a member with college -0.093** -0.012 -0.124*** 
 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) 
Rural location 0.049 0.057* 0.039 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.036) 
Regional controls yes yes yes 
    
Wald chi2 (21) 251.78*** 150.79*** 227.15*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.1068 0.1123 0.1242 
Log likelihood -1203.358 -645.497 -9611302 
Observations 1,945 1,272 1,616 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The regional controls included are: Dakar, Dioubel, Fatick, Kaolack, Kolda, Louga, Matam, St-Louis, 


















Table 6: Balancing test for the propensity score matching ± Kernel estimator 
 
Pscore for each 
treatment 
 
Treated Control %bias  %reduct 
bias 
t-test  p>t R=V(T)/V(C) 
         
Recipient Unmatched .58211    44403 79.6 
 
17.56   0.000 0.93 
 
Matched .57151    .57108 0.2     99.7 0.06   0.954 1.00 
         
Internal recipient Unmatched .34888    .22717 82.0 
 
13.07   0.000 1.18 
 
Matched .34756    .34709 0.3     99.6 0.04   0.969 1.00 
         
External recipient Unmatched .50872    .35061 87.1 
 
17.39   0.000 1.18* 
 
Matched .5011     50057 0.3     99.7 0.05   0.958 1.00 




Table 7 Estimates of ATT by type of treatment: recipient; internal recipient; external recipient 
 Food Durables Education Health Other 
RECIPIENT      
Nearest neighbor -0.042*** -0.083 0.012** 0.012* 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.081) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) 
Five Nearest neighbor -0.028** -0.036 0.007* 0.008 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.051) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
Ten Nearest neighbor -0.030*** -0.040 0.009** 0.008 0.000 
 (0.011) (0.047) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
Radius Caliber (0.01) -0.033*** -0.035 0.009** 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.012) (0.048) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
Kernel -0.031*** -0.039 0.008** 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.045) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
Mahalanobis-metric -0.054*** -0.023 0.007 0.002 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.068) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) 
INTERNAL RECIPIENT      
Nearest neighbor 0.000 -0.260 -0.008 0.016* 0.005 
 (0.020) (0.107) (0.007) 0.008 0.013 
Five Nearest neighbor -0.009** -0.092 -0.002 0.009 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.059 (0.005) 0.008 0.011 
Ten Nearest neighbor -0.005 -0.057 -0.001 0.006 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.051) (0.005) 0.007 0.010 
Radius Caliber (0.01) -0.012 -0.054 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 (0.015) (0.051) (0.005) 0.007 0.010 
Kernel -0.014 -0.055 0.004 0.009 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.052) (0.005) 0.007 0.010 
Mahalanobis-metric -0.018 -0.053 0.006 0.008 0.009 
 (0.019) (0.108) (0.005) 0.008 0.012 
EXTERNAL RECIPIENT      
Nearest neighbor -0.043*** -0.023 0.010 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.016) (0.040) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
Five Nearest neighbor -0.041*** -0.037 0.013** 0.004 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.054) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
Ten Nearest neighbor -0.041*** -0.055 0.011** 0.006 -0.006 
 (0.013) (0.051) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Radius Caliber (0.01) -0.043*** -0.051 0.010** 0.007 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.050) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Kernel -0.043*** -0.047 0.010** 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.012) (0.049) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Mahalanobis-metric -0.068*** -0.016 0.011** -0.004 0.003 
 (0.015) (0.059) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The common support option is chosen; the bandwidth for the Radius Caliber is fixed at 0.01. Consistent 



















Table 8: Mixed Multinomial Logit for remittance status (marginal effects ±first step) 
VARIABLES Non-recipient Internal recipient External recipient 
Ethnicity: Woloff -0.100*** -0.025 0.125*** 
 
(0.034) (0.023) (0.034) 
Ethnicity: Pular -0.089** -0.031 0.120*** 
 
(0.041) (0.026) (0.041) 
HH size -0.001 -0.009*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
No. of working age members -0.055*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
Average working age members -0.008*** 0.003 0.005** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female share (>15) -0.133 -0.119* 0.252*** 
 
(0.089) (0.067) (0.086) 
Elderly (>65) -0.129*** 0.018 0.112*** 
 
(0.026) (0.018) (0.025) 
Children (5-15) -0.096*** 0.061*** 0.035 
 
(0.035) (0.022) (0.004) 
Average years of schooling -0.020*** 0.001 0.019*** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Having at least a member with College 0.088** 0.025 -0.113*** 
 
(0.042) (0.033) (0.035) 
Rural location -0.047 0.036 0.011 
 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.030) 
Regional controls yes yes yes 
    
Observations 1,945 1,945 1,945 
Wald chi-sq 343.5 343.5 343.5 
Pseudo R-sq 0.100 0.100 0.100 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The regional controls included are: Dakar, Dioubel, Fatick, Kaolack, Kolda, Louga, Matam, St-Louis, 
Tambacounda, Thies and Ziguinchor. 
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Table 9: Selectivity-corrected estimates of budget share equations ± Working-Leser model 
VARIABLES Food Durables Education Health Other 
Internal recipient 0.086*** -0.066 0.026*** -0.013 -0.010 
 
(0.019) (0.044) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) 
External recipient -0.103*** -0.058 0.019*** -0.013 0.050*** 
 
(0.018) (0.056) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) 
Log of tot exp -0.069*** -0.233*** -0.011*** 0.013*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.006) (0.049) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Ethnicity: Woloff 0.017 0.095** -0.013** 0.007 0.003  
(0.011) (0.045) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Ethnicity: Pular 0.016 0.051 -0.007 0.007 0.002  
(0.013) (0.043) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
HH size 0.002* 0.007 0.001 -0.001* -0.000  
(0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
No. of working age members 0.001 0.002 -0.001* 0.001* -0.001  
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Average working age members 0.001 0.002 -0.001* 0.001* -0.001  
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female share (>15) 0.022 0.084 -0.011 0.008 -0.015  
(0.030) (0.101) (0.013) (0.016) (0.025) 
Elderly (>65) 0.006 0.000 -0.007** 0.017*** -0.001  
(0.009) (0.029) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Children (5-15) 0.021* -0.019 0.027*** -0.005 -0.013  
(0.012) (0.039) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
Average years of schooling -0.004*** 0.017*** 0.005*** -0.002* -0.005***  
(0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Having at least a member with College -0.006 0.039 0.007 0.004 0.011  
(0.014) (0.047) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
Rural location 0.024** -0.205*** -0.003 0.020*** 0.051*** 
 (0.011) (0.033) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) 
Regional controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Lnsigma -2.251*** -0.327* -2.697*** -2.329*** -2.165*** 
 
(0.123) (0.196) (0.047) (0.046) (0.067) 
Lambda internal recipient -0.107*** -0.009 -0.026*** 0.022*** 0.018** 
 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Lambda external recipient 0.101*** 0.057** -0.004 0.018** -0.080*** 
 
(0.019) (0.026) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) 
Observations 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes: The regional controls included are: Dakar, Dioubel, Fatick, Kaolack, Kolda, Louga, Matam, St-Louis, 













Table 10: Marginal budget shares and elasticities after selectivity correction 
 Food Durables Education Health Other 
Marginal budget share - No remittances 0.272 0.533 0.042 0.094 0.165 
 (0.006) (0.049) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Marginal budget share - Internal remittances 0.255 0.540 0.040 0.092 0.178 
 0.016 0.096 0.006 0.011 0.014 
Two-tailed test (internal vs no remittances) -0.943 0.053 -0.170 -0.135 0.832 
      
Marginal budget share- External remittances 0.261 0.527 0.043 0.089 0.156 
 0.013 0.093 0.006 0.009 0.011 
Two-tailed test (external vs no remittances) -0.682 -0.055 0.192 -0.431 -0.775 
Elasticity - No remittances 0.810 0.697 0.784 1.180 1.292 
 0.023 0.095 0.060 0.071 0.051 
Elasticity -  Internal remittances 0.759 0.706 0.763 1.160 1.393 
 0.049 0.125 0.106 0.136 0.111 
Two-tailed test (internal vs no remittances) -0.316 0.041 -0.009 -0.011 0.106 
      
Elasticity-  External remittances 0.779 0.689 0.809 1.123 1.216 
 0.038 0.122 0.116 0.112 0.084 
Two-tailed test (external vs no remittances) -0.682 -0.055 0.192 -0.431 -0.775 




























Figure 3: Distribution of the propensity score for treated and untreated before and after 








































































































The treatment is expressed through a dummy variable Dj equal to one if household j 
receives remittances and zero if it does not. Let Yij1 and Yij0 indicate the outcome variables 
representing the budget share in good i for household j in the presence and absence of treatment, 
respectively. The budget share in good i for household j is expressed as  ௜ܻ௝ ൌ ܿ௜௝Ȁ݁ݔ݌௝; where 
cij is the consumption in good i for family j and expj indicates the total household expenditure. 
The treatment effect is the difference in the relevant outcome for unit j between the situation 
in which the treatment occurs and the one in which it does not occur.  
 
)1|()1|( 01    ' jijjiij RYERYEY    (A1.1)  
 
The problem is that we do not observe the same unit under the two different states: we 
can estimate E(Yij1|Rj=1) and E(Yij0|Rj=0) but not their counterfactuals E(Yij1|Rj=0) and 
E(Yij0|Rj=1). Propensity score matching represents a solution to the potential bias coming from 
the unobservability of the counterfactual outcomes.  
The methodology consists in generating a single index value ± the propensity score ± 
which summarizes the pre-treatment characteristics of each subject and makes it possible the 
matching between those who receive the treatment and those who do not. The propensity score, 
which can be expressed as P(X) = P(Rj=1|X), represents the probability of receiving the 
treatment conditional on observed covariates. As suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 
1985), the use of the propensity score reduces the dimensionality of the matching which 
becomes a problem when there are n-vectors of covariates. The comparison between treated 
and not treated units, on the basis of observable characteristics, assumes that assignment to the 
treatment is random and unobservables play no role in the treatment assignment (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002). The propensity score matching methods expect that given a set of observable 
variables X, the outcome of interest is independent of the treatment participation. This 
condition is known as conditional independence assumption and it requires that only those 
covariates which are not affected by receiving remittances should be included in the model. 
The conditional independence assumption is expressed as:   




A further requirement is the common support or overlap condition which states that 
individuals with the same characteristics have equal positive probability to receive or not the 
treatment.  
1)(|)1Pr(0   jj XPR      (A1.3) 
 
These assumptions (A1.2) and (A1.3) ensure that observations with the same propensity score 
must have the same distribution of observable characteristics independently of the treatment 
status. This implies that the exposure to the treatment is random. Following that it is possible 
to express the counterfactual as: 
))(,0|())(,1|( 00 jjijjjij XPRYEXPRYE      (A1.4) 
 
And finally, the PSM estimator for the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is 
VLPSO\³WKHPHDQGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHRXWFRPHVRYHUWKHFRPPRQVXSSRUWDSSURSULDWHO\ZHLJKWHG
E\WKHSURSHQVLW\VFRUHGLVWULEXWLRQRISDUWLFLSDQWV´&DOLHQGRDQG.RSHLQLQg, 2008, p. 4): 
)(,0)|()(,1)|( 01 jjijjjijij XPRYEXPRYEY     '  (A1.5) 
Given that the participation to the treatment is expressed as a dichotomous variable, the 
estimation of the propensity score over a set of covariates uses logit or probit models. Empirical 
studies have adopted several matching methods and we are going to perform and compare the 
most widely used. Overall, the matching estimators ensure that treated and comparison units 














APPENDIX  2 
Using the functional form described as (1) in the text: 
 ijjddjijijiiij ulRXY  OTJED explog                               (A2.1)  
 








                                                 (A2.2) 
 
From equation (A2.1), the partial derivative of the budget share with respect to the total 
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mbs   EE
exp
       (A2.4) 
 
Eq. (A2.4) can be calculated after estimating equation (A2.1). 
Using the definition of elasticity, the expenditure elasticity of good i for household j is given 
by the following expression: 






EE        (A2.5) 
 
The model with interaction terms becomes: 
ijjddjj
*
ijijijiiij ulRȕRXY  OTJED explogexplog   (A2.6) 
 
Our focus here is on the vector 24 which allows us to compute marginal budget shares and 
expenditure elasticities for the three household remittances status. In particular, the marginal 
                                                          









budget shares and demand elasticities for those who receive remittances (from internal or 
external sources) are: 
 










       
(A2.8) 
 
Eqs (A2.4) and (A2.5) apply for those who do not receive remittance. 
